I. Introduction
To what extent are European courts entitled to control administrative decisions? This issue is at the very heart of every administrative law system. It is therefore also at the core of the European competition law, whose enforcement is entrusted to the European Commission.
The Court of Justice of the European Union shall review the legality of the Commission's decisions on the Article 263 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) grounds. This is a comprehensive control of the legality of the European Commission' decisions, which extends to the law, the facts and their appraisal (Section II). Bear in mind that what is at stake is the protection of citizens' rights through an independent and impartial instance (Article 6(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)). Moreover, European courts have the socalled 'unlimited jurisdiction' related to fines, by which they can not only void, but also amend the quantum of the sanction, increasing or reducing it (Article 261 TFEU in relation to Article 31 of Regulation No 1/2003).
However, judicial review has its limits as well. The legal framework entrusts the European Commission with the task of defining and implementing competition policy, not the courts. Therefore, the role of the European courts is to control the legality of the Commission's decisions and to protect the citizen's rights, but not to enforce competition law. This raises two limits for judicial review.
First, under Article 263 TFEU the courts are entitled to annul the Commission's decision, but they cannot pronounce on the merits of the case (Section III). Courts are not the competition authority, so they are not supposed to get involved in making economical appraisals, providing evidences or taking executive decisions instead of the European Commission.
Second, the exercise of administrative discretionary powers can be challenged when it is contrary to the legal framework and, in particular, to the general principles of law (Section IV). However, courts cannot substitute their own discretion for that of the European Commission. For the same reason, in complex economic and technical issues, judicial review can eventually be limited to verifying whether the Commission made a manifest error in the assessment of the facts (Section V). Courts' scrutiny has become more intense over time. However, we have to accept that in the appraisal of the facts sometimes there is not a right or wrong answer, but a margin of discretion. Thus, when there is a margin for choice, it is for the Commission rather than for the courts to make the decision. Finally, unlimited jurisdiction (Article 261 TFEU) does not prevent the courts from leaving a significant leeway to the European Commission in the application of fines (Section VI). Ultimately, the power to impose fines can be regarded as a means conferred on the Commission to carry out a general competition policy.
In short, judicial review needs to strike the right balance between the conflicting forces of improving courts' scrutiny as a means to protect the citizens' rights, on the one hand, and leaving the competition authority the necessary room to shape and implement competition policy, on the other.
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II. Comprehensive control of legality
As a rule, the Court of Justice of the European Union shall review the legality of the Commission's decisions on the Article 263 TFEU grounds. 1 It could be argued that Article 261 TFEU does not limit the powers of the judge to the amount of the fines, but extends them to the whole fining decision. 2 If this were the case, a major part of competition law enforcement would be subject to unlimited jurisdiction. However, according to case law, unlimited jurisdiction refers exclusively to the penalties for infringement of Articles 101-102 TFEU, which can be regarded as criminal in nature. 3 Therefore, the jurisdiction to amend fines is more limited than it may first appear.
To begin with, it should be noted that Article 263 TFEU does not amount to a limited form of judicial review ('light judicial review'), 4 but is a comprehensive way to review the law, the facts and their appraisal. It has been argued that courts should not be limited to annulling a Commission decision but should be empowered to submit a final decision, when this seems appropriate. 5 We can accept this, as long as we do not forget that courts cannot become competition authorities, as we will see below. This means that courts can only make a decision when the procedure has gathered enough evidence and there is no room for administrative discretion.
The reason for a comprehensive judicial review is that what is at stake is not just the control of legality ('the objective legal order'), but also the protection of citizens' rights. Competition law enforcement can have a significant bearing on fundamental rights, such as private property, freedom of commerce and industry (Articles 16 and 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union) or due process and fair trial (Article 6(1) ECHR). The European Commission is an administrative body engaged in the-day-to-day management, while courts are independent and impartial bodies entrusted with the task of controlling the legality of administrative actions, declaring law and protecting citizens' rights. 6 An effective regime of judicial review acts as counterbalance to 6 Heike Schweitzer (2009, 26) argues the need of a shift in the field of judicial review 'from a ''mere'' objective legality control to a dual-goal system in which objective legality control and individual rights protection are equally relevant '. Understanding the limits of judicial review in European competition law 2014 the Commission's broad powers. 7 Therefore, we are bound to make an interpretation of the Treaty rules in such a way that ensures effective judicial protection, which is not only a general principle of European law, but also a right under Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 8 The legal frameworks of the Member States can also reinforce this interpretation. For instance, in German law judicial review is considered a fundamental right granted to any person who is potentially violated in his rights by any act of a public authority (Article 19 [IV] Of the Basic Law). 9 This explains why, according to Article 263 TFEU, the European courts carry out a comprehensive review of issues of law, 10 including the procedural guarantees. Control of legality also extends to the facts on which the administrative decision is based and to their appraisal.
11 These elements are intertwined, since it is usually hard to distinguish between facts, law, and economic appreciations. 12 Somehow, they are all facets of the same process of review. 13 For instance, the Court annuls the Commission's decisions regarding State aids when it finds errors in law from; failing to carry out the assessment of the selectivity of the measure, 14 the application of the 'private creditor test' 15 or a comprehensive review as to whether the tax scheme at issue came within the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU. 16 Obviously, control of legality also extends to the evidence provided for the Commission to prove the infringements 17 10 On the contrary, reasoning on judicial review of questions of law, it has been held that 'There is no a priori reason why the courts' view on the legal meaning of a statutory term should necessarily and always be preferred to that of the agency . . . The court's interpretation may not necessarily be better than that of the agency, and adequate control may be maintained through a rationality test rather than substitution of judgement ' Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 206 VOL. 2 drawn from it 18 (Article 2 Regulation 1/2003). 19 The tendency to apply a more economic approach to competition law enforcement requires that the Commission has a more demanding standard of proof in order to establish the economic effects of its decisions. 20 A decision can be made void when based on insufficient, incomplete, insignificant and inconsistent evidence. 21 For instance, in Hellenic Republic, the General Court annulled the Commission's decision, since it had not provided sufficient evidence to prove the abuse of dominant position (Article 102 TFEU). In this regard, it does not suffice to argue that the State measure distorts competition by creating inequality of opportunities between economic operators (Article 106 (2) TFEU). 22 In Deutsche Post, the Court held that the Commission was not entitled to classify as State aids the payments made to an undertaking entrusted with discharging a public service obligation, since it failed to check whether they exceeded the total amount of the net additional costs resulting from such obligations. 23 Similarly, in MTU Friedrichshafen, the Court stated that the Commission cannot assume that an undertaking has benefited from a State aid solely on the basis of a negative presumption, based on a lack of information enabling the contrary to be found, if there is no other evidence capable of positively establishing the actual existence of such an advantage. 24 Notwithstanding this, it is clear that the proof of the existence of the prohibited effect may be inferred from a bundle of converging facts having a certain degree of reliability and coherence. 25 In short, courts must not only control the law, but also the facts, their appraisal and the evidence provided by the European Commission to support its decision. In this sense, it is worth highlighting that control of the facts and of their appraisal is equally crucial within national legal frameworks. It is true that in the USA, the appellate review model rests on the assumption that the initiating institution (agency) has superior competence in questions of fact, while the reviewing institution has superior competence in issues of law and will decide the matter independently. 26 This assumption leads the courts to be deferent to agency decisions (Chevron). 27 The rationale is 'to place policymaking in the hands of the politically accountable agencies to which Congress has delegated that power, rather than in the hands of politically unaccountable judges '. 28 However, in the USA antitrust law is not enforced by an administrative body, but directly by the courts. In contrast, in all European jurisdictions, courts are not restrained to a mere control of law, but fully control the facts and their appraisal. In the UK, the decisions of the Office of Fair Trading can be appealed to the Competition Appeal Tribunal (specialized administrative body 29 ), which carries out a control on the merits of decisions, such as the imposition of fines and the blocking of mergers, as well as the legality of such decisions. 30 A merits reviewer may affirm or vary the decision, or set the decision aside and either make a substitute decision or remit it to the primary decision-maker for reconsideration ('the merits reviewer ''stands in the shoes of the primary decision-maker'' '). 31 A further appeal is available from the Tribunal to the 'appropriate court' but only regarding points of law or penalty amounts. Generally speaking, the courts exercise a 'supervisory' jurisdiction, since they are primarily concerned with the legality of the decision, not with its merits. 32 However, 'the substantive distinction between legality and merits are merely points on a continuum representing the degree to which bureaucratic compliance with norms of good-making is subject to external scrutiny and the extent to which non-compliance with such norms is remediable '. 33 In this context, it is accepted that not all errors of fact lie beyond the reach of judicial review. In particular, courts have to control whether the decision-maker: has acted in absence of the required facts which allow him to exercise the power entrusted by the legislature (error of precedent fact); has failed to take into account all relevant considerations and/or has disregarded irrelevant considerations; has provided enough evidence; or has acted under a misunderstanding or in ignorance of relevant facts (error of material fact). 34 In comparison, in German competition law, judicial review is entrusted to civil law courts. According to the inquisitorial principle, it is the court's responsibility to ascertain, if necessary, the relevant facts ex officio, not only in fining procedures, but also in merger cases. 35 In this context, courts have full control of the facts. They can also take into account new facts and evidence not considered by the administrative Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 208 VOL. 2 authority. However, according to the principle of separation of powers, the role of the courts is to review, not to substitute the administrative decision. 36 They have to respect the administrative authority's competence to define the scope of the subject matter of a case, and its role as the first and principal investigator. In French law, 37 similarly, the courts are less deferent to agency decisions than in the USA. The competition authorities are subject to the Court of Appeal (civil law jurisdiction), which has to examine in fact and in law the administrative decisions. 38 If it declares the appealed decision void, the court has to replace or reform it with its own decision, to terminate the dispute. Merger cases, however, are subject to the Council of State (administrative jurisdiction), which applies a standard of marginal review (contrôle restraint) when the administrative authority exercises discretionary powers. 39 Although, this standard of review not only controls errors of law, but also errors in the facts and errors in characterizing the facts in law. In Italian law, decisions taken by the competition authority are subject to administrative jurisdiction (Consiglio di Stato), which not only controls the law, but the facts as well. 40 Moreover, there is a control of the merits relating to the amount of the fines. In Spanish competition law, judicial review is not regarded as a sort of second instance, but as a comprehensive control of law and facts. 41 In the Netherlands, courts fully review the law and the facts, although some deference to the administrative bodies can be found in the assessment of the facts in the light of the law. 42 Thus, it is clear that contrary to the deference shown to decision-making agencies in the USA, there are various ways in which the courts in European jurisdictions may engage in judicial review of such decisions.
III. European courts cannot become competition authorities
Comprehensive judicial review under Article 263 TFEU should not make us forget that competition enforcement is entrusted to the European Commission, which acts as investigator, prosecutor, and decision-maker. Understanding the limits of judicial review in European competition law 2014 209 information and evidence relied on by the Commission in its decision is sufficient to establish the existence of the alleged infringement. 44 This explains why control of legality under Article 263 TFEU is limited to annulling the Commission's decisions. Notwithstanding this, we could admit that courts can go further and declare the rights at stake when the procedure has gathered enough evidence and there is no margin for discretion. However, in competition law issues, courts have little room for doing so, since they mainly deal with infringements or with decisions that have to be taken by the Commission. Thus, when the court annuls a merger decision in whole or in part, the concentration shall be re-examined by the Commission with a view to adopting a new decision (Article 10 (5) . 45 In sum, it 'is not for the Court to pronounce itself on the merits of the case, and even less to take over the role of the administration in the event of an annulment to proceed to a fresh decision complying with the judgement of the Court' 46 . The limits of judicial review do not stem from the fact that the Commission is technically best placed to deal with such issues, but from the principle of separation of powers, 47 which guarantees the administrative body's ability to act within the territory assigned to it by the Treaty 48 and the legal framework. For this reason, the exercise of administrative discretionary powers can be challenged by the courts only insofar as it is contrary to the legal framework and, in particular, to the general principles of law. Courts cannot substitute their own discretion for that of the European Commission. This is also the reason why courts are not supposed to act as competition authorities, getting involved in making economical appraisals, 49 providing evidences, and taking executive decisions instead of the Commission. 50 Also it is important to note that proceedings before the courts of the European Union are inter partes.
51 Thus, it is not for the courts to review of their own motion the weighting of the factors taken into account by the Commission to determine the amount of the fine. 52 With the exception of pleas involving matters of public policy which the courts are required to raise of their own motion (eg failure to 44 . 51 Case C-389/10 P, para 131. 52 ibid para 63.
Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 210 VOL. 2 state reasons for a contested decision), it is for the applicant to identify the impugned elements of the contested decision, formulate grounds on which to challenge and adduce evidence to demonstrate that its objections are well founded. 53 In the context of such exceptions, to a certain extent, the court can sometimes be engaged in fact-finding. The Court may require the parties to produce all documents and to supply all information considered desirable (Article 24 of the Protocol). 54 If necessary, it may also demand the Member States and institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies not party to the case to supply all information that the Court deems necessary for the proceedings (Article 24). During the hearings, the Court of Justice may examine experts, witnesses and the parties themselves (Article 32). However, in most cases, the Court relies on the information contained in the administrative file, inquiring whether the facts adduced by the Commission are reliable, consistent, and sufficiently meaningful in relation to what has been challenged by the applicant. 55 The limits of judicial review can be clearly seen in the European Courts' case law. For instance, in CEAHR the Court annulled the Commission's decision 56 declaring the absence of sufficient Community interest in continuing the investigation, since such a conclusion was vitiated by insufficient reasoning, the failure to take account of a relevant factor raised in the complaint, and manifest errors of assessment. 57 However, the Court did not declare the existence of sufficient Community interest so that the Commission could continue its examination of the complaint. The Court was not ready to make such an assessment in place of the Commission. On the other hand, it could not be ruled out that with a more accurate reasoning the Commission could have demonstrated the absence of community interest. For the same reason, the Court stated that the Commission had committed a manifest error of assessment in defining the relevant market, 58 but did not get involved in defining the market on its own.
59
Clearly, 'it is not for the Court to carry out its own analysis of the market but that it must confine itself to verifying, as far as possible, the correctness of the findings in the decision '. 60 In EDF, the Court annulled the Commission's decision for not having applied the private investor test to appraise whether fiscal measures could be qualified as State aids. 61 However, the Court did not take on this task of applying the test, but left it to the Commission to adopt the necessary measures to comply with the 53 ibid para 132. 54 62 The Court annulled the contested decision, but did not take on the duty to carry out the analysis on its own. This was not self-restraint in judicial review, but showed the Court's inability to carry out administrative investigations in order to prove whether economic advantages were involved or not. In Deutsche Post, the Court annulled the decision, in as far as the Commission had carried out no examination of whether the State payments exceeded the net additional costs of a public service obligation. 63 However, it did not rule on whether there was State aid or not. It was not for the Court to replace the Commission by carrying out in its stead an examination it never carried out and drawing the conclusions which the Court itself would have drawn. 64 The same issue arises with Article 101(3) TFEU cases, 65 where the court is empowered to annul the administrative decision, but cannot substitute its own economic assessment for that of the institution that took the decision under review. 66 For the same reason, in abuse of dominant position cases (Article 102 TFEU), the court can only control the adequacy of the method of calculating the rate of recovery of costs chosen by the Commission 67 and its application, including the calculations (mathematical operations). 68 The Court can neither suggest an alternative method, nor replace the analysis of costs made by the Commission.
Finally, it is also very revealing that infringement of the right of access to the Commission's file during the procedure prior to adoption of a decision cannot be remedied by the mere fact that access was made possible during the judicial proceedings. 69 An examination undertaken by the court has neither the objective nor the effect of replacing a full investigation of the case in the context of an administrative procedure. 66 Joined Cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P and C-519/06 P, paras 242 and 243; Case T-111/08, para 202 . 67 69 Joined Cases C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission [2002] ECR I-8375, para 318. 70 Case C-110/10 P Solvay v Commission, para 51.
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IV. Discretionary powers
The main competition policy options are provided for in the Treaty in detail. However, sometimes the European Commission has the ability to make competition policy choices. 71 In these cases, the Commission can decide what is most convenient to achieve the Treaty goals, by choosing among different interests. 72 Indeed, discretionary powers are the lawful power to choose 73 between more than one outcome. 74 The first way through which the European Commission exercises discretionary powers is by acting as regulator. The Commission is entitled to propose regulations (Article 289(1) TFEU) and to address directives to ensure fulfilment of competition rules by undertakings with special or exclusive rights, or by undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest, or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly (Article 106(3) TFEU).
Second, the Commission has discretionary powers to launch sector inquiries, as a way to detect anticompetitive behaviours. For instance, it is for the Commission to decide whether its staff should focus their attention on monitoring patent settlements between originator and generic companies in the pharmaceutical sector or whether it is better off targeting the electricity markets.
Third, sometimes advocacy can be the most efficient means to pursue the competition authority's goals. 75 In this case, it is also for the Commission to decide on the best way to persuade governmental bodies to design competition friendly policies and to alert consumers to the benefits of a well-functioning market.
Forth, to a limited extent, the regulatory framework allows taking into account non-competition goals when applying competition law. 76 To achieve the goals of Article 107(3) TFEU, State aids may be considered compatible with the internal market. According to settled case law, the Commission has a wide discretion to allow State aids by way of derogation from the general prohibition laid down in Article 107(1) TFEU. 77 Fifth, more doubtful is whether discretionary powers are provided for in Article 101(3) TFEU. The prohibition of agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices may be 71 Craig (n 29) 533 . 72 Marco D'Alberti, 'Administrative Law and the Public Regulation of Markets in a Global Age' in Rose-Ackerman and Lindseth (n 10) 68. 73 Graham (n 30) 244. 74 Leyland and Anthony (n 32) 215. Understanding the limits of judicial review in European competition law 2014 213 declared inapplicable, provided that the Treaty conditions are fulfilled. Under the system of individual exception granted by the Commission previously, it could be argued that the European Commission enjoyed discretionary powers. However, discretionary powers are hard to find after the 2003 framework reform, which makes undertakings responsible for appraising whether or not they fulfil the conditions for the exception. Either way, the distinction between discretionary powers and margin of appraisal is relative, since the latter also entails discretion, although to a lesser extent. On the other hand, the undertaking claiming the benefit of Article 101(3) TFEU has to prove that the conditions for providing the exception are fulfilled (Article 2 of Regulation No 1/2003). 78 The Commission must adequately examine the arguments and evidence offered by the parties, to ascertain whether they demonstrate that those conditions have been satisfied. 79 Sometimes the arguments and the evidence may be refuted by the Commission, failing which it is permissible to conclude that the burden of proof borne by the person who relies on the exception has been discharged. 80 Courts must strike down discretionary decisions when they infringe the legal framework or are deemed not to be proportionate, that is, whether they are suitable, necessary and the least restrictive method for attaining the desired goal. However, discretionary powers are subject to a limited judicial review, 81 since courts cannot make policy choices in the place of the public bodies charged by the Treaty with competition law enforcement.
82 It 'is not for the courts to substitute their choice as to how the discretion ought to have been exercised for that of the administrative authority ' . 83 As we have seen, discretionary powers grant the European Commission the ability to decide what is more convenient to achieve the competition policy goals, by setting priorities and choosing the means and criteria by which the decision has to be reached. 84 Discretion cannot simply be transferred from agency heads to judges. 85 It cannot be right for the court to overturn a decision merely because it would have balanced the conflicting interests differently. 86 It would 'entail a re-allocation of power from the legislature and bureaucracy to the courts '. 87 In this sense, decisions implying elements of economic policy would be clearly excluded from a 'comprehensive' review. 82 Leyland and Anthony (n 32) 235. 83 Craig (n 29) 642. 84 Bailey (n 50) 1338. 85 Davis and Pierce (n 28) 106. 86 Craig (n 29) 659. 87 ibid 642. 88 Jaeger (n 47) 310.
Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 214 VOL. 2 For instance, focusing investigations on certain sectors or allowing State aids to protect environment or culture are decisions to be taken by the European Commission, not by courts. It is settled case law that judicial review of the Commission's discretion in applying the Article 108(3) TFEU exception is confined to establishing that the rules of procedure and the rules relating to the duty to give reasons have been complied with, to verifying the accuracy of the facts relied on, and verifying that there has been no error of law, manifest error of assessment of the facts or misuse of powers. 89 The court must also verify whether the Commission has observed the requirements laid down in the Guidelines. 90 In fact, in Electrolux, the General Court annulled the Commission's decision because of the manifest error of assessment in the examination of the distortion of competition. 91 However, the court cannot substitute its own economic assessment for that of the Commission.
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V. Margin of appraisal in complex economic and technical issues
Competition law enforcement often involves the need to make complex economic or technical 93 assessments. According to settled case law, in these cases the appraisal of the facts is subject to a more limited judicial review, as courts only control whether the European Commission made a manifest error of assessment.
94
What does this mean?
It is readily apparent that these issues are subject to judicial review under Article 263 TFEU, which does not provide for exceptions to the control of the Commission's decisions. 95 The Commission has to state the reasons on which the decisions are based (Article 296 TFEU) 96 and, in particular, it 89 Case C-409/00 Spain v Commission Understanding
has to explain the weighting and assessment of the factors taken into account. 97 As we have seen, the appraisal of facts and evidence 'falls within the Court's complete discretion'. 98 Courts cannot refrain from reviewing the Commission's interpretation of information of an economic nature. 99 The obvious reason for this is that the legality of enforcement measures depends on whether there are legal assumptions or not. Indeed, 'review of both fact and discretion has become more intensive over time ' . 100 The Court has demonstrated that it is 'prepared to look quite deeply into both the Commission's findings on primary facts and into the inferences drawn from them when determining whether its analysis was vitiated by manifest errors of assessment'. 101 Moreover, as we have seen, to a certain extent, the court can get involved in fact finding.
As discussed, the Commission's leeway has been considerably reduced by several decades of case law, which set out standards of proof and very detailed interpretation criteria. For instance, the definition of the relevant market involves complex economic appraisals 102 . However, sometimes the courts do not hesitate in reviewing the Commission's findings, as can be seen in Telefónica 103 . To take another example, in Deutsche Telekom, the Court stated that the choice of method used to establish a margin squeeze is subject to a restrained judicial review 104 . However, it did not prevent the Court from controlling whether the abusive practices had been properly determined by the Commission. The Court concluded that the Commission was correct to analyse the abusive nature of the pricing solely on the basis of the own charges and costs of the dominant undertaking, rather than looking at the situation of current or potential competitors.
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The Court also stated that for the purposes of calculating margin squeeze, the Commission was entitled to take account only of revenues from access services and to exclude revenues from other services, such as call services. 106 The quality of the evidence produced by the Commission is particularly important in merger control, which is based upon a prospective analysis. 107 When assessing the compatibility of a concentration with the common market, the court controls whether the Commission has taken into account the whole set of factors that determines strengthening the company's dominant position (Article 2(1) of the Regulation) and not just whether there will be a reduction in potential competition. 108 In merger cases, the European courts have checked 'meticulously the accuracy, reliability and consistency of the evidence taken into account by the Commission in its decisions, so as to ensure that the evidence provides a sound factual basis for the adoption of the contested decision'. 109 In Tetra Laval, the Court annulled the Commission's decision declaring the proposed concentration incompatible with the common market because of the failure in establishing the anti-competitive effects that could have been expected from the operation. 110 Commitments offered by the undertaking are factors that the Commission has to take into account when assessing the likelihood that the merged entity would act in such a way as to make it possible to create a dominant position in one or more of the relevant markets.
111
In this context, when courts refer to the limits of judicial review related to complex assessments, ultimately, they are accepting the limits resulting from the principle of separation of powers, which put a margin of appraisal in the hands of the Commission to ascertain whether we are or not in presence of legal assumptions. The 'legal characterization of the facts' (appraisal of the facts) is by far the most subjective parameter 112 in competition law enforcement. It may be said that courts' scrutiny should be as intense as possible, however, the point is that applying the criteria enshrined in Article 263 TFEU to complex economic and technical matters does not always allow a determination of whether the Commission was right or wrong ('There is nothing inherently wrong with either choice' 113 ). In these cases, there is a margin of appraisal that can only be controlled to a certain extent by legal principles, or by alternative technical reports. Such technical reports would not, in most cases, lead to more certainty in the analysis, but merely to another assessment. It may well be, therefore, that marginal judicial review should be confined to a few cases. 114 It has also been claimed that courts cannot put the resolution of disputes into the hands of non-legal experts, 115 but that they have to take on the responsibility of declaring the law. However, in these cases courts can only ascertain whether there has been a manifest error of appraisal, that is, a mode of action that falls outside the given set of reasonable modes. 116 Marginal review is applied, as the court is otherwise at risk of substituting its own views for those of the administrative body.
In this sense, for instance, the Commission enjoys of a degree of latitude regarding the choice of econometric instruments and appropriate approaches to the study of any matter, provided that those choices are not manifestly contrary to the accepted rules of economic discipline and are not applied inconsistently. 118 Thus, the more novel the discussed issues or the more controversial the nature of economic reasoning, the greater the margin of appraisal enjoyed by the Commission. 119 For this reason, courts can only void the Commission's decisions when they are based on a 'manifest error' of assessment. In other words, in these cases, the applicant has to make a special effort to show that the Commission's decision was not based on sound economics. 120 In the same vein, most national jurisdictions accept some kind of deference to administrative discretionary powers. In cases involving such powers, French courts apply a standard of 'marginal review' (contrôle restraint). In Italy, courts carry out a less intense scrutiny in relation to complex technical appraisals (valutazioni tecniche opinabili).
121 UK courts exercise very limited scrutiny in issues of economic policy or technical expertise, although they will check whether there is a factual basis for the decision, supported by adequate reasoning. 122 In the Netherlands, the decisions that are made on the basis of 'discretion in assessment' are reviewed marginally. 123 Courts are deferent to the legal and economic choices made by the national authorities (discretion in the assessment of the facts in the light of the law). Moreover, full review of the facts hardly ever takes place, since it is very difficult to separate facts from the assessment of facts.
In short, according to Article 263 TFEU, the Commission's assessments of complex economic and technical matters are subject to a comprehensive judicial review. In fact, courts scrutiny has become more intense over the time. However, in the appraisal of the facts sometimes there is not a right or wrong answer, but a margin of discretion. This is the reason why in these cases judicial review can eventually be limited to verify whether the Commission made a manifest error of assessment. . 124 In other words, this is not just a control of the lawfulness of the penalty, but also a control of the merits, which empowers the courts to substitute their own appraisal for the Commission's. 125 In this sense, courts substitute the Commission's decision when based on errors of law, since legal interpretation is specifically entrusted to them. In exercising its sanctioning powers, the European Commission is bound to respect the legal framework. In fixing the amount of the fine, it has to take in to consideration both the gravity and the duration of the infringement (Article 23(3) of Regulation No 1/2003). In addition, the Guidelines 126 determine the method that the Commission has bound itself to use in assessing the fines, which ensures legal certainty on the part of the undertakings. 127 In this context, courts amend the Commission's decisions when they do not comply with the legal requirements, including the general principles of law. For instance, it would be discriminatory to apply different methods of calculation to fine the undertakings that have participated in a cartel. 128 In Ventouris, the Court reduced the amount of the fine, since the Commission had punished to equal extent the undertakings that were found guilty of two infringements and those that were found guilty of only one of them, in disregard of the principle of proportionality. 129 In Chalkor, the Court reduced the starting amount of the fine, to take account of the fact that the Commission held that the undertaking was liable for participation only in one of the three branches of the cartel. 130 Courts can also substitute the Commission's decision vitiated by errors of fact or by errors in the appraisal of facts, especially when the evidence at disposal clearly leads to another outcome. In GDF Suez, the General Court reduced the total amount of the fine to amend the error of the Commission regarding the infringement period, although it did not do so proportionally, since it would not take into account all the relevant circumstances. 131 In particular, due to the presumption of innocence, courts cannot conclude that the Commission has established the existence of the infringement at issue to the requisite legal standard if they still have doubts on that point. 132 Where there is doubt, the benefit of that doubt must be given to the undertakings accused of the infringement.
VI. Unlimited jurisdiction related to fines
The jurisdiction of the EU Courts under Article 261 TFEU is unlimited; in practice, however, the case-law gives the European Commission significant leeway in the calculation of fines.
To begin with, the basic amount of the fine is related to the value of sales, 133 depending on the gravity of the infringement. 134 The gravity of infringements has to be determined by reference to numerous factors, such as the particular circumstances of the case, its context and the dissuasive effect of fines, and no binding or exhaustive list of the criteria that must be applied has been yet drawn up. 135 In this regard, the Commission may not depart from the Guidelines in an individual case without giving sound reasons for doing so. In such cases, the Commission has to demonstrate that there is no infringement of the equal treatment principle. 136 In this sense, administrative precedent can offer an indication for determining whether there is discrimination. 137 However, the level of the fine set by the Commission does not represent a change in its policy that fines warrant specific explanation, but represents a standard application of that policy. 138 The Court has repeatedly held that the Commission's practice in previous decisions is not binding for the Commission, since it is not part of the legal framework. 139 Accordingly, the fact that the Commission in the past has imposed fines set at a specific level for certain categories of infringements cannot prevent it from setting fines at a higher level, if raising penalties is deemed necessary in order to ensure implementation of competition policy. 140 The Commission may at any time adjust the level of fines, if proper application of the competition rules so requires, 141 since it may then be regarded as justified by the objective of general prevention. 142 their denunciation. 156 In this sense, the Court must control whether the Commission has provided unequal treatment to the applicants for leniency, 157 taking into account the facts in order to decide whether the applicants were in a comparable position or not (such as precedence in supplying information to the Commission, quality, and usefulness of the supplied information, etc.). 158 However, within those limits, the Commission enjoys certain discretion in assessing the quality and usefulness of the cooperation provided by an undertaking, in particular by reference to the contributions made by other undertakings. 159 Accordingly, the review carried out by the Court in the context of the leniency program is limited, 160 since only an obvious error of appraisal is capable of being censured. 161 The complainant has to show that, in the absence of the information provided, the Commission would not have been in a position to prove the infringement. 162 This being so, we have to wonder why courts leave considerable latitude to the European Commission in the application of sanctions. The reason is once more that the role of the courts is to control the legality and to protect the rights at stake, not to become competition authorities.
Setting the amount of fines requires taking into account a large number of factors, which necessarily gives the Commission a variety of options in their assessment, their weighting and their evaluation so as adequately to punish the infringement. 163 Bear in mind that the Commission's power to impose fines, ultimately, is one of the means conferred on it to carry out the task of supervision entrusted to it by the Treaty. 164 That task not only includes the duty to investigate and sanction infringements, but it also encompasses the duty to pursue a general policy designed to apply, in competition matters, the principles laid down by the Treaty and to steer the conduct of undertakings in the light of those principles. 165 It explains that courts recognize a significant leeway to the decision-maker, in assessing the conduct and determining the fine: 'the Commission enjoys a wide discretion when exercising its power to impose such fines '. 166 In fact, courts can only substitute the administrative decision when it is quite evident that the conduct deserves another fine, in as far as the evidence at and implement competition policy. On the one hand, European courts must carry out a comprehensive review of the Commission's decisions, extending to the inextricably linked factors of the law, the facts and their appraisal (Article 263 TFEU). The reason being that what is at stake is not just the control of legality of the Commission's decisions, but also the protection of citizens' rights. However, on the other hand, we cannot forget that judicial review and competition law enforcement are different functions. The legal framework entrusts the European Commission, rather than the courts, with the task of implementing competition policy. This raises some limits for judicial review.
First, under Article 263 TFEU the European courts are entitled to annul the Commission's decision, but as a rule they cannot pronounce on the merits of the case, since they are not supposed to get involved in making economical appraisals, providing evidences and taking executive decisions instead of the European Commission.
Second, the exercise of discretionary powers by the European Commission can be challenged when it is contrary to the legal framework and, in particular, to the general principles of law. However, courts cannot substitute their own discretion for that of the Commission.
Third, courts' scrutiny of complex economic and technical assessments made by the European Commission has become more intense over the time. However, we have to accept that the appraisal of the facts does not always allow for a determination of whether the Commission was right or wrong. Thus, when there is a margin for choice, it is for the Commission, not for the courts to make the decision. This is the reason why, according to settled case law, in these cases judicial review can eventually be limited to verifying whether the Commission made a manifest error in the assessment of the facts.
Fourth, in spite of their unlimited jurisdiction (Article 261 TFEU), in fact courts give a significant leeway to the European Commission in assessing conduct and determining fines. Once more, this reflects the role of the courts, which is to control the legality and protect the rights at stake, but not to be the preeminent enforcer of competition law. In addition, it is doubtful that increasing a fine conforms with the aim of judicial review to protect citizens' rights, due to the dissuasive effect associated with the reformatio in peius.
